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R. BLAKE BROWNt 
INTRODUCTION 
To the ability and devotion of the profession in past generations must 
largely be attributed the heritage we have today. But the tendency, 
which unfortunately is becoming so prevalent, to deny to the 
individual his traditional right of access to the Comis, threatens to 
undermine the achievements of centuries. In utter disregard of 
consequences, the functions of Courts are being transferred to 
government departments and boards. Thus the sacred rights of 
individuals are often entrusted to the whims of officials whose main 
qualification is political loyalty and who have no knowledge or 
appreciation of those precedents which have stood the test of time.' 
So asserted H.G. Sparling, a prominent Saskatchewan lawyer, in 
193 7. His view was representative of the fears of many Canadian legal 
professionals about the administrative state during the l 930s. 2 
Concerned about the erosion of traditional legal principles, and applying 
comparisons to the emerging fascist states of Europe, many Canadian 
lawyers and judges launched vitriolic attacks on the growth of 
government regulation and c01Tesponding use of administrative bodies 
to implement new social and economic policies. 
This view, however, did not go unopposed during the Depression 
decade. Several prominent legal academics in Canada, notably W.P.M. 
Kennedy, E. Russell Hopkins, J.A. Corry, John P. Humphrey, John 
Willis, and Jacob Finkelman, argued that the modem Canadian state 
required the use of government tribunals and boards as a method of 
implementing policy. As we shall see, the arguments of these authors 
reflected an important shift in how Canadian legal professionals thought 
t I would like to thank Professor R.C.B. Risk and John Saywell for their advice and 
suppo1i, and Jennifer Llewellyn, and the editors of this journal for their helpful comments. 
1 "Editorial: Views of the Profession" (1937) 2 Sask. Bar Rev. 23 at 28-29. 
2 See, for example, Sir William Mulock, "Address on his ninetieth birthday, 1934" (1934) 
12 Can. Bar Rev. 35; and J.W. de B. faffis, "Justice of the Courts" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 
509. 
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about the law. This article will explore the shifting attitudes within the 
Canadian legal academy about administrative law between 1930 and 
1941. This article will also explore why this change in attitudes 
occuffed, and whether these academics affected the broader Canadian 
legal community's views about the modem administrative state. These 
issues will be discussed in a five-part analysis. Section one outlines how 
Canadian legal professionals considered administrative agencies before 
19 30. Section two indicates the importance of the Depression to the re-
evaluation of administrative law. Section three identifies the major 
Depression-era legal writers in Canada who discussed the emergence of 
the regulatory state. In section four, this paper compares and contrasts 
the major themes of these authors. Finally, section five assesses how the 
contents of Canada's legal journals at the end of the 1930s indicates a 
broadening acceptance of administrative law. It will be shown that these 
academics critiqued traditional ways of thinking about the relationship 
between citizen and state, and undermined the formalist view of the law, 
but in the end were less successful in providing an intellectual 
framework for the future development of Canadian administrative law. 
In making these assertions, this paper builds upon research by 
R.C.B. Risk, who has demonstrated the existence of a Canadian legal 
realist movement during the late 1920s and, paricularly, in the 1930s.3 
However, Risk has thus far failed to provide an in depth exploration of 
how these Canadian scholars attempted to reshape thinking about the 
administrative state. As early as 1984, Risk briefly demonstrated in the 
Dalhousie Law Joumal that during the 1930s an important shift 
occurred in thinking about the administrative state,4 but to date no 
Canadian legal historian has adequately assessed these trends. This 
paper will attempt to fill this void by surveying the Canadian writing on 
administrative law found in Canada's legal publications during the 
Depression era, and by placing this literature within the English and 
American intellectual context. 
3 For Risk's best developed descriptions of the Canadian legal realist movement, see 
R.C.B. Risk, "The Many Minds ofW.P.M. Kennedy" (1998) 48 U.T.L.J. 353; R.C.B. Risk, 
"The Scholars and the Constitution: P.O.G.G. and the Privy Council" (1996) 23 Man. L.J. 
496; R.C.B. Risk, "Volume I of the Journal: A Tribute and Belated Review" (1987) 37 
U.T.L.J. 193. Also see R.C.B. Risk, "John Willis: A Tribute" (1985) 9 Dal. L.J. 521. 
"R.C.B. Risk, "Lawyers, Courts, and the Rise of the Regulatory State" (1984) 9 Dal. L.J. 
31. 
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II. CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PRE-1930 
It is difficult to separate the histories of Canadian administrative 
and constitutional law during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In England, the supremacy of Parliament dictated that the 
government could empower government departments with 
administrative powers which, theoretically, were safe from judicial 
intrusion. In Canada, however, the division of legislative 
responsibilities between provincial and dominion governments 
established by the British North America Acf (BNA Act) meant that 
administrative agencies often faced challenges to their constitutional 
validity. 
The history of Canadian administrative law was therefore often tied 
closely to that of the constitution, a history that has long been 
contentious among Canadian political historians concerned with the 
battles between the provincial and federal governments during the 
nineteenth century. For example, the titanic struggle between Sir John 
A. Macdonald and Ontario's Premier Mowat has been immortalized by 
historians as just one chapter in the long story of Canadian federalism. 6 
More recently, the intellectual battlefield on which the politicians met 
has been documented. 7 Historians such as Blaine Baker argue that 
Canadian lawyers and judges demonstrated a willingness to consider the 
policy ramifications of their decisions well into the nineteenth century.8 
In comparison to the early twentieth century, the law-versus-policy and 
private-versus-public distinctions were more fluid, and Canadian judges 
more concerned with the social and economic effects of their decisions 
than with the creation of a scientific, logical set of legal doctrines. The 
result of these trends was a more deferential mode of judicial 
interpretation that generally supported government regulatory 
initiatives. 
5 Co!lstitutio11 Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c.3. 
6 See, for example, C. Atmstrong, The Politics czf Federalism: Ontario s Relations with the 
Federal Gowmment, 1867-1942 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981 ). 
7 Robert Vipond, Liberty a11d Comm1mity: Canadian Federalism and the Failure ef the 
Constitution (Albany: State University of New York, 1991 ). 
8 G. Blaine Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-
Victorian Empire" (1985) 3 Law & History Review 219. 
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However, by the late nineteenth century Canadian legal 
professionals were affected by the rise of legal formalism an 
international phenomenon that altered many areas of the law. Legal 
formalism, a complicated concept, could be characterized by an 
adherence to four principles. First, it was premised by a strong belief that 
law was composed of 'scientific' legal rules that could be discovered by 
a careful study and application of legal principles. Second, these legal 
rules could best be discerned and applied by a close examination of 
previously decided cases. Thus, judges applied an increasingly rigid 
doctrine of stare decisis during formalism's rise to ensure that there was 
little deviation from established principles. Third, legal documents such 
as legislation and contracts were often thought to speak for themselves, 
such that a judge could interpret the meaning of legal documents by 
simply looking for the 'plain meaning' of the words. Extrinsic evidence, 
such as legislative debates or proof of the parties' intentions, was 
thought to be unnecessary. Fourth, it was assumed that judges could 
impartially hear the case before them, having little concern with the 
policy implications of their rulings. Decisions were to be made on the 
basis of scientific legal doctrines, rather than unpredictable attempts to 
adjudicate cases based on the equity of legal outcomes.9 The high priest 
of English legal formalism in the realm of constitutional and 
administrative law was A.V. Dicey. His analysis emphasized individual 
rights, and the role of courts as the upholder of these rights. 10 
Legal formalists held administrative law to be obnoxious for 
several reasons. Tribunals were free to disregard precedents, and 
interpreted statutes by explicitly considering policy ramifications. They 
reduced the primacy of courts, and the protection of individual rights 
seemed less likely when administered by agencies employing 
procedures different from those used in the courts. With the gradual 
expansion of the administrative state in England in the late nineteenth 
century, and its rapid increase during and after World War One, 
formalists lashed out at the increasingly important government 
9 The international literature on formalism is extensive. See, for example, Morton J. 
Ho1witz, The Transj0r111atioll ()/American 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1977); and P.S. Atiyah, The Rise()/ Freedom o/ Co11trac/ (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984). 
10 See Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theo1y (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 
at 140-162. 
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departments vested with authority to make administrative decisions. 
Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England, provided a formalist 
reaction to the growing bureaucratic state in his famous 1929 book The 
New Despotism/1 an attack which received support from several 
English academics, including C.K. Allen and Sir John Marriott. 12 
Several American scholars mirrored these critiques. 13 
Formalism also played an important role in shaping how Canadian 
lawyers thought about the administrative state during the early twentieth 
century. For most of the late nineteenth century, Canadian comis 
applied a less formalist interpretation of the constitution that permitted 
the existence of administrative bodies. However, by the end of the 
nineteenth century formalism began to affect the interpretation of the 
BNA Act such that the legislative spheres of the Dominion and the 
provinces were judicially interpreted to be completely separate. 14 This 
polarization of legislative responsibilities provided courts with the 
opportunity to strike down administrative schemes that infringed the 
legislative spheres of the dominion or provincial governments. Implicit 
in this emerging jurisprudential trend were substantial concerns about 
the increasing size of the administrative state. Bernard Hibbitts argues 
that the Supreme Court's 1920 Board o.fCommerce15 decision marked a 
watershed in the relationship between the Supreme Court and the 
Canadian state. In the liberal-individualist state encouraged by 
formalism the role of "the judiciary was limiting and restraining,'' 
Hibbitts suggests, and its duty "was to protect the individual, the 
ultimate creative and responsible force in society, against the state. Law 
11 Baron Gordon Hewart, The NeJtJ Despotism (London: Fe Benn, 1929). 
12 For a discussion of this literature see Loughlin, sttpra note 10 at 162-165. Allen's major 
contributions during this period included C.K. Allen, Law Ii1 the Malai1g (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1927); and C.K. Allen, Bureaucracy Triz111tpha11t (London: Oxford University Press, 1931 ). 
Marriott's work included J. Marriott, English Political fllstitutions, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1930); and J. Marriott, The Mechanisms ()f the Modem State (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1927). 
13 For a discussion of American debates on the value of the administrative law, see Horwitz 
(1992), s1tpra note 9 at 213-246. 
14 R.C.B. Risk, "Canadian Courts Under the Influence" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 687 at 689. Also 
see R.C.B. Risk, "A.H.F. LeFroy: Common Law Thought in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Canada: On Burying One's Grandfather" 41 (1991) U.T.L.J. 307; and R.C.B. Risk, 
"Constitutional Thought in the Late Nineteenth Century" ( 1991) 20 Man. L. J. 196. 
15 Ri!fermce Re The Board of Commerce Act alld the Fair Prices Act of 1919 (1920), 60 
S.C.R. 456. 
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was the crucial boundary between the two, shielding the one from the 
power of other and defining the parameters of their respective spheres." In 
regards to administrative law, this movement required that administrative 
"discretion was to be restrained in the name of the rule oflaw." 16 
m. THE DEPREssmN AND THE crus1s IN 
CANADIAN LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
The 1930s were among the most turbulent years in Canada's 
history. Unemployment rates skyrocketed, international trade and per 
capita income plummeted, and western farmers struggled to keep their 
land productiove. The economic crisis spurred the growth of new 
political parties, such as the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation 
and Social Credit Party. Early efforts to battle the Depression saw 
governments restrict spending, although a movement for more liberal 
spending policies slowly gained strength. Stories of jobless men 'riding 
the rails' still permeate Canadians' collective memory, and rapid 
declines in today's stock market quickly result in comparisons to the 
Great Crash of 1929. 
To their collective memory of the Depression, Canada's lawyers 
add the famous constitutional cases of the 1930s. These cases are 
typically remembered as the judiciary's rejection of a variety of 
dominion, and to a lesser extent, provincial, programs aimed at 
alleviating the effects of the Depression. Several cases decided by the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in the early 1930s had 
given hope to those advocating for greater dominion powers. 17 In 
Proprieta1y Articles Trade Association v. A. G Canada, 18 the JCPC 
upheld dominion legislation by employing an expansive reading of 
Ottawa's criminal law jurisdiction. In two reference cases, Radk/9 and 
Aeronautics,20 the JCPC determined that the dominion government 
16 Bernard J. Hibbitts, "A Bridle for Leviathan: The Supreme Court and the Board of 
Commerce" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 65 at 104. Also see Bernard J. Hibbitts, "A Change of 
Mind: The Supreme Court and the Board of Railway Commissioners, 1903-1929" (1991) 41 
U.T.L.J. 60. 
17 Risk, "The Scholars," supra note 3 at 505-506. 
18 Proprielmy Articles Trade Association v. A.G. Canada [1931] A.C. 668. 
19 Re Regulation and Control o/ Aeronautics [1931] A.C. 54. 
20 Re Regulat1011 and Control q/ Radio Comm1micat1011s [ 1932] A.C. 18. 
42- DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
could implement national legislation in order to fulfill commitments 
undertaken when the government in Ottawa signed international 
treaties. However, this perceived trend toward increased dominion 
powers ended in 1936 and 1937 when both the Supreme Court and JCPC 
found most of Prime Minister R.B. Bennett's 'New Deal' legislation to 
be ultra vires the dominion government.21 The New Deal legislation 
sought to implement regulatory and administrative schemes to combat 
the Depression. The JCPC upheld a federal act to assist the ravaged 
prairie agricultural industry,22 but struck down legislation creating new 
labour regulations, 23 establishing a system of unemployment 
insurance,24 devising an industry competition policy,25 and creating a 
method of marketing natural products. 26 
As today's law students struggle to stay attentive to lectures about 
these seemingly 'ancient' federalism decisions, the importance of them 
is undoubtedly lost. These cases, and the debates they stimulated among 
lawyers and academics, created a crisis in Canadian legal analysis no 
less important to the development of Canadian law than was the creation 
of the CCF to Canadian social and political life. The basic assumptions 
of legal analysis were questioned in the face of new social realities. This 
debate often focused on the administrative state, as Canadian lawyers 
and academics sought to reshape the role oflaw in light of the expansion 
of government regulatory initiatives. This struggle also occuned in the 
United States and Britain. According to Morton Horwitz, for instance, 
the American social context of the early twentieth century required that 
constitutional law 
confront the meaning of its long-standing commitment to the idea of 
neutrality. Amidst increasing pressure to bring law into closer touch 
21 A.G. Ca11ada v. A.G. 011tario [1937] A.C. 326; A.G. Ca11ada v. A.G. Ontario [1937] 
A.C. 355; A.G. B. C v. A.G. Ca11ada [1937] A.C. 368; A.G. B.C v. A.G. Ca11ada [1937] A.C. 
377; A.G. B.C v. A.G. Canada [1937] A.C. 391; and A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada [1937] 
A.C. 405. For a discussion see W.H. McConnell, "The Judicial Review of Prime Minister 
Bennett's 'New Deal"' (1968) 6 Osgoode Hall L.J. 39. 
22 Fanners' Credito1:r Arrangement Act, 24-25 Geo. V, c.53. 
23 This included the Limila!iol! o/Ho1trs of Work Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c.63, the Weekly 
Rest in /11d11strial in /11dustrial U11dertahi1gs Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c.14, and the Minim1tm 
Wages Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c.44. 
24 Unemployment Insurance: Tile Employment and Social Insurance Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 
1935, c.38. 
25 Domli1io11 Trade and /ndt1st1y Commission Act, 25-26 Geo. V, c.59. 
26 Natural Prodt1c! Marketing Act, 24-25 Geo. V., 1934, c.57. 
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with society, what could remain of the post-revolutionary ideal that of 
a government of laws whose judges saw their role as impartially 
discovering and declaring pre-existing law? What was to be the fate of 
the still-broader nineteenth-century ideal of a neutral, non-distributive 
state astride an American society becoming ever more unequal in 
wealth and power?27 
In the United States these challenges led a number of scholars and 
legal professionals, under the names 'sociological jurisprudence' and 
then 'legal realism,' to question the assumptions of American 
formalism. The literature on these movements is substantial, 28 but a 
definition of American legal criticism remains difficult.29 Nevertheless, 
a general outline of key principles is possible. Beginning in the early 
twentieth century a number of American academics, notably Roscoe 
Pound, developed a theory of 'sociological jurisprudence' based upon a 
belief that the law had lost step with society, and that judges should 
consider the economic and social consequences of their decisions. 30 A 
product of the American Progressive movement, advocates of 
sociological jurisprudence considered social science methods in legal 
analysis, and were optimistic about their ability to correct the law. In the 
1920s and 1930s, this stream of thought was expanded by American 
Legal Realists, a more cynical movement which refuted suggestions that 
the law was based upon abstract, scientific principles, and that judges 
were impartial.31 A heated debate emerged in the early 1930s between 
Pound and Legal Realism's most famous proponent, Karl Llewellyn, in 
27 Horwitz (1992), stijlra note 9 at 5. 
28 For recent discussions see N.E.H. Hull, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching 
.fer a11 American Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); John Henry 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); William W. Fisher III, Morton J. 
Horwitz, and Thomas A. Reed, Ame1ican Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993); and Horwitz (1992), ibid. 
29 Horwitz suggests that "Legal Realism was neither a coherent intellectual movement nor 
a consistent or systematic jurisprudence. It expressed more an intellectual mood than a clear 
body of tenets, more a set of sometimes contradictory tendencies than a rigorous set of 
methodologies or propositions about legal theory." Horwitz (1992), ibid. at 169. N.E.H. Hull 
meanwhile asks: "If the men who lived through the controversy could not define legal 
realism's central tenets, what hope had the historians?" Hull, ibid. at 174. 
3° Kermit L. Hall, The Magic lvftiror: Law in American Hist01y (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) at 224. 
31 ibid. at 269. 
32 Horwitz (1992), szijlra note 9 at 169-192. 
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which Llewellyn attacked Pound's ideas, which, by the 1930s, Realists 
deemed too conservative. Despite this controversy, the underlying 
challenge to legal formalism offered by sociological jurisprudence and 
legal realism, according to Horwitz, makes the similarities between the 
movements greater than their differences.32 
THE CANADIAN LEGAL REALISTS AND 
CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In the late 1920s and particularly in the 1930s several Canadian 
legal academics, like their American contemporaries, sought to 
reconceptualize the relationship between the state and the citizen by 
questioning commonly held assumptions about the law.33 The small size 
of the English-Canadian academic legal community during the 1930s 
(approximately twenty full-time law professors in English Canada) 
dictated that no one university became the center of legal realism in 
Canada.34 Rather, a number of law professors from across the country 
played important parts in the movement. The most prominent 
participants in the defence of administrative law were John Willis of 
Dalhousie University; McGill's John P. Humphrey; Jacob Finkelman 
and W.P.M. Kennedy at the University of Toronto; and J.A. Corry and 
E.R. Hopkins of the University of Saskatchewan.35 Often armed with 
33 Risk, "The Many Minds," supra note 3 at 369-370. 
34 Dalhousie, for example, the oldest common-law school in Canada, had four full-time 
professors in 1930. John Willis, A Hist01y (}( Dal!tousie Law Sc/tool (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1979) at 103. Ontario had only two law programs prior to 1957. The 
practitioners' school, Osgoode Hall, had four full-time lecturers for most of the 1930s; the 
University of Toronto law program employed the same number of full-time professors in 
1930. C. Ian Kyer and Jerome Bickenbach, T!te Fiercest Debate: CeC1! A. Wrig!tt, t!te 
Bellc!ters, alld Legal Edt1catioll Iii Ontario, 1923-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1987) at 115. 
35 Little Canadian writing on administrative law existed prior to these authors. Nigel 
Tennant published perhaps the first major aiiicle in Canada on the subject in the 1928 
Ca11adia11 Bar ReJJiew. Tennant considered the power of the courts to review the decisions of 
administrative agencies in cases where the legislature had not expressly provided for such a 
review. Tennant's arguments demonstrated his adherence to some formalist ideas. For 
example, he suggested that, in the absence of express statutory provisions outlining the 
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American legal ideas gained through graduate work at top American law 
schools,36 this group of Canadian academics questioned the principles 
of legal formalism concerning administrative law in the hope of 
affecting positive change. 37 
In John Willis, Dalhousie had one of the most zealous proponents 
of the administrative state. Born in England, Willis studied at 
Winchester, Oxford, and Harvard. He joined Dalhousie's law school in 
1933 and remained there until 1944, at which time he moved to Toronto 
to join the faculty of Osgoode Hall Law School. Willis worked for the 
legal department of the International Monetary Fund in 194 7-1948, and 
procedure to be employed by administrative boards, tribunals should use the procedures 
developed in the courts. Tennant, however, did recognize the value of these tribunals' 
expertise: 
Presumably, a Board which exercises its energies and abilities within a 
narrow field would be more efficient in solving the problems referred to it 
than would a Court. The purpose and policy of creating Administrative 
Boards is, in paii at least, based upon such an expectation. Does it not 
seem anomalous, therefore, to suggest that an appeal should be allowed 
from an expert to a non-expe1i body? 
Nigel B. Tennant, "Administrative Finality" (1928) 6 Can. Bar Rev. 497 at 513. 
36 Willis studied at Harvard under the guidance of Felix Frankfurter. Risk, "John Willis," 
supra note 3 at 526. Corry completed a masters degree in law at Columbia in 1935. Finkelman 
was likely exposed to American realists when he attended the University of Toronto School of 
Law. According to Bora Laskin, it was Kennedy who introduced him "to the riches of 
American legal scholarship, to Holmes and Brandeis and Cardozo, to Pound and Frankfurter, 
to the American legal realists, to Morris Cohen and Jerome Frank, and to so many others." 
Bora Laskin, "Cecil A. Wright: A Personal Memoir" (1983) 33 U.T.L.J. 148 at 150. Other 
graduates of the Kennedy law school were likely similarly affected, including Finkelman who 
began lecturing at the University of Toronto School of Law in 1930 and completed a LLB in 
1933. 
37 This paper will not analyze the work ofD.M. Gordon. Gordon was a Victoria lawyer who 
published extensively on administrative law from the 1920s to the 1970s. Like many of the 
authors explored in this paper, Gordon supported the expansion of the administrative state 
during the 1930s, but he nevertheless remained a proponent of formalist doctrines. Kent Roach 
has explored this seeming contradiction in Gordon, concluding that his work demonstrates 
that the formalist tradition did not have to result in hostility toward the administrative state. 
According to Roach, "Gordon conceded much freedom to administrative bodies because he 
believed that their work did not involve the recognition of legal rights and that no principled 
and consistent grounds justified judicial intervention." Thus, if "control could not be 
categorized, it had to be abandoned." Kent Roach, "The Administrative Law Scholarship of 
D.M. Gordon" (1989) 34 McGill L.J. 1at33, 35. For Gordon's major articles of the 1930s see, 
for example, D.M. Gordon, "The Observance of Law as a Condition of Jurisdiction" (1931) 47 
L.Q. Rev. 386; and D.M. Gordon, '"Administrative' Tribunals and the Comis" (1933) 49 L.Q. 
Rev. 94. 
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in 1949 he accompanied Wright and Laskin in resigning from Osgoode 
Hall and joining the School of Law at the University of Toronto.38 
John Humphrey received his B.C.L. from McGill University in 
1927. Called to the Quebec bar in 1929, Humphrey began lecturing in 
Roman Law at McGill in 1936, and in 1946 became dean of the McGill 
law faculty. Though he primarily focused on international law and 
human rights issues for the majority of his academic career, Humphrey 
took an interest in administrative law in the late 1930s and 1940s. 
At the University of Toronto law program, W.P.M. Kennedy and 
Jacob Finkelman defended the use of administrative tribunals. Trained 
as a English historian, Kennedy's interests shifted during the 1920s 
toward the study of Canadian constitutional law. Kennedy also played 
an important role in the history of legal education in Ontario. The law 
program at the University of Toronto was just a sub-department of the 
Political Economy Department until Kennedy reshaped legal education 
at the University. Named 'Professor of Law and Federal Institutions' in 
1927, Kennedy soon led an increasingly distinct law program. The 
University made law a separate department in the Faculty of Arts in 
1930, and eleven years later created the 'School ofLaw.' 39 
Born in Poltava, Russia, Jacob Finkelman emigrated to Canada at 
the age of eight months when his parents settled in Hamilton, Ontario. 
Finkelman graduated with a B.A. from the University of Toronto in 
1926, and proceeded to Osgoode Hall, from which he graduated in 1930 
with honours. The law school at the University of Toronto recognized 
his talents, and immediately after his graduation from Osgoode he 
joined the teaching staff at Kennedy's law school as a lecturer in 
Industrial and Administrative law. In 1932, Finkelman inaugurated the 
first course in Labour law taught in Canada. The following year, the 
University of Toronto granted Finkelman LL.B and M.A. degrees, and 
appointed him a professor. By the early 1940s Finkelman garnered 
respect as one of Canada's leading labour law experts. He assisted in the 
preparation of Ontario's first collective bargaining act, and took a one-
year leave of absence from the law school in 1943 to act as the first 
Registrar of the Ontario Labour Court. In 1944, Finkelman returned to 
teach at the School of Law, but also became Chairman of Ontario's 
Labour Board. 
38 See Risk, "John Willis," supra note 3. 
39 Risk, "The Many Minds," supra note 3 at 353-354, 365, 370-371. 
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Like the University of Toronto, Saskatchewan had a pair of 
professors advocating the acceptance of administrative law: James 
Alexander Corry, and E. Russell Hopkins. Corry graduated with a 
Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Saskatchewan in 1923, 
received a B.C.L from Oxford in 1927, and a LL.M from Columbia 
University in 1935. Corry taught law at the University of Saskatchewan 
between 1927 and 1936 before moving to Queen's University, where he 
taught in the political science department until the 1960s. Corry's 
primary academic interests included statutory interpretation and 
administrative law. 40 E. Russell Hopkins attended law school in 
Saskatchewan in the early 1930s, and came under the influence of, 
among others, Corry. After attending Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, 
Hopkins returned to the University of Saskatchewan to teach. Like 
Corry, Hopkins' interests included administrative law and statutory 
interpretation. 
Collectively, these academics attempted to reshape the legal 
profession's view of administrative law. While the authors were not 
identical in their approaches, topics, or quality of work, they shared 
several mutual assumptions about how the law should be 
reconceptualized with regard to the regulatory state. This paper will 
provide an analysis, in turn, of the work of John Willis, W .P .M. 
Kennedy, J.A. Corry, Jacob Finkelman, E.R. Hopkins, and John 
Humphrey. 
Z: John Wtl/is and the 'Functional Approach ' 
An English legal historian reading this paper might be perplexed by 
the inclusion of Willis in a discussion of Canadian writing on the 
administrative state during the 1930s. After all, prior to Willis' 1933 
appointment to Dalhousie, much of his writing focused on English legal 
developments. However, Willis developed an interest in the study of 
Canadian administrative law as the Depression decade unfolded. His 
fellow Canadian legal realists were undoubtedly pleased by his shift in 
emphasis, for Willis possessed considerable expertise in administrative 
40 See J.A. Corry, 1l{J: Life a11d Work: A Happy Par!!lership (Kingston: Queen's University, 
1981). 
41 For a full discussion of all of Willis' scholarly work see Risk, "John Willis," supra note 3. 
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law, and one of the keenest minds in the Canadian legal academic 
community.41 
Willis' expertise in administrative law, powerful analysis, and 
focus on English developments during the early 1930s were all on 
display in his 1933 book The Parliamentary Powers of English 
Government Departments.42 Willis was one of several English legal 
academics, including William Robson and Ivor Jennings,43 to respond 
to C.K. Allen and Lord Hewart's attacks on the administrative state. 
Willis suggested that the Lord Chief Justice's had descended "from 
Olympus to launch an attack upon the 'lawlessness' of the government 
departments," but that it was "time to call a halt and look more closely 
into a few of the extraordinmy powers criticized by Lord Hewart."44 He 
further asserted that the development of administrative government 
departments reflected the new social realities of a more complex society. 
The majority of his book discussed the procedures Parliament could use 
to implement the administrative state. Some of the key issues identified 
by Willis formed the basis for his future work on Canadian 
administrative law. For example, he criticized the formalist methods of 
interpreting regulatory statutes. Willis explained that, "armed with a 
dictionary," 
the Court impartially construes the words, and since the words have 
little meaning apart from an environment in which they are used, the 
Court, compulsorily ignorant of their true environment, must place 
them against the background of the Common Law, and replace the 
assumptions of 1931 by the assumptions of Lord Coke.45 
Willis thought the solution might be the creation of administrative 
courts, for the expanded fonn of government "must be administered by 
42 John Willis, The Porliame11101y Powe1'.r ol English G0Fen1me11! Deportments 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). 
43 For a discussion of these scholars see Loughlin, supra note 10 at 165-181. Robson's 
major work in this period was Justice a11d Admi11islraliJJe Low: o Study o/ lhe British 
Conslilulio11 (London: Macmillan, 1928). Jennings work tended to focus on both 
administrative and constitutional law. See W.l. Jennings, The Law and the Co11stilu/io11 
(London: University of London, 1933); W.I. Jennings, "The Report on Ministers' Powers" 
(1932) 10 Public Admin. 333; and W.l. Jennings, "The Courts and Administrative Law The 
Experience of English Housing Legislation" ( 1936) 49 Harvard L.R. 426. 
44 Supra note 42 at 3. 
45 Ibid. at 1 71. 
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those who do not draw their inspiration from Common Law 
analogies."46 
Willis' first direct foray into the Canadian discussion about 
administrative law came in 1935. In his article, "Three Approaches to 
Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the 
Functional"47 published in the first issue of the University qf Toronto 
Law Journal, Willis argued that it was a common and necessary feature 
of English government to delegate powers to departments and 
commissions. After establishing the necessity of such bodies, Willis 
suggested that the practical problem was "how to fit into our 
constitutional structure these new institutions whose growth seems 
inevitable."48 Willis argued that the answer to this question depended on 
which of three possible approaches one took toward government by 
departments or commissions: the judicial approach, the conceptual 
approach, or the functional approach. 
Advocates of the judicial approach perceived statute law as an 
intrusion upon the internal coherence on the common law, were 
"uncompromisingly individualistic," such that rights "of prope1iy and 
freedom from personal restraint are sacred,"49 and believed that 
administrative law included an excessive application of executive 
discretion. The result of these views was "an increase in the class of 
discretions which the court is prepared to control,"50 the widening of 
procedural errors for which courts would deprive tribunals of 
jurisdiction, and courts' increased willingness to review administrative 
decisions despite privative clauses. 51 
Willis critiqued the creation of well-defined legal categories in his 
discussion of the conceptual approach. In the conceptual approach, 
judges formulated neat categories by relating the "unknown to the 
known," and perceiving "the likeness in unlike things."52 Willis 
46 /bid at 172. For additional comments by Willis on English developments see John 
Willis, "The Delegation of Legislative and Judicial Powers to Administrative Bodies" (1932-
1933) 18 Iowa L.R. 150. 
47 John Willis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, 
and the Functional" (1935-1936) I U.T.L.J. 53. 
48 /bid. at 59. 
49 /bid. at 60. 
50 /bid. at 61. 
51 Ibid. at 62. 
52 /bid. at 69. 
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identified, as indicative of this type of reasoning, the distinction 
commonly employed in England between 'judicial' and 'quasi-judicial' 
functions. Formalists claimed that quasi-judicial decisions were based 
on policy considerations, while judicial ones were not. Willis, however, 
argued that decision-making bodies could not be so neatly defined into 
such categories, and that the dichotomous division into judicial and 
quasi-judicial broke down when applied to practical problems. Willis 
asserted that all decisions involved policy choices, and thus "either all 
decisions of appellate comis are 'quasi-judicial,' and so need not be 
made by the ordinary courts at all, or else all decisions by administrative 
bodies ... are judicial and so must be made by a judge and the court of 
king's bench."53 Although he undermined the conceptual differences 
between tribunals and courts, Willis still believed that each body 
possessed different sets of skills. He thus argued that decision-making 
responsibilities should be assigned to the person or body best suited to 
make specific types of determinations. For example, when policy was a 
paramount factor, comis were inadequate decision-makers because 
"although skilled in the ascertainment of facts and in weighing of 
arguments," comis were "unskilled in the consistent determinations of 
policy."54 
Willis preferred the functional approach to administrative law, 
which required the establishment of commissions or 'governments in 
miniature' to hear policy-oriented disputes. These commissions would 
be appointed by the executive, but be free of departmental control and 
possess memberships with security of tenure. These boards would often 
include a lawyer, "for he is best equipped to investigate and estimate the 
weight of facts upon which the decision of the board will be based," and 
several others having "special knowledge of the problem which the 
legislation is designed to solve, for policy can best be translated into 
action by those who know the background against which it is placed. "55 
Willis recognized the problem of unlimited administrative 
discretion, but believed that the regular courts were not well-suited to 
considering appeals from tribunals. In three ways Willis criticized the 
English and Canadian practise of pe1mitting appeals to the courts for 
53 Ibid. at 75. 
54 Ibid. at 77. 
55 Ibid. at 78. 
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errors oflaw. First, he suggested that allowing the courts to overturn the 
decision of a specialized tribunal meant that "the amateur is asked to 
upset the expert. " 56 Second, questions of law were difficult to 
differentiate from questions of fact. Last, Willis argued that the best way 
to secure a responsible commission "is to show some confidence in the 
ability of the men selected to do their job faithfully and according to the 
law."57 Having argued that courts were ill-suited to review commission 
decisions, Willis advocated for the creation of a special administrative 
review court, which, like the lower tribunal, possessed specialized 
knowledge of the subject area within its jurisdiction. 
In a 193 9 Harvard Law Review article, Willis again examined what 
courts actually did, explaining how Canadian courts employed 
techniques of interpretation to permit reviews of administrative 
decisions. In so doing, Willis provided his most explicit statement of the 
role of politics in shaping legal analysis. Willis argued that the increased 
legislation since World War One had prompted the judiciary to strike 
back. Big business interests began constitutional battles to prevent 
legislative incursions into the /aissez-fitire market. Business received 
favourable hearing from Canadian judges, and in many cases "the 
political ideas behind the supposed constitutional prohibition against 
'abdication' [delegation] are seen in their most naked form. "58 In 
addition, the bench feared encroachments on the powers of courts. 
According to Willis, the trends in Canada could be explained by taking 
into "account the all-powerful force of judicial legislation" and by 
remembering "that behind that force lies the desire to protect against 
'encroachments' on the traditional jurisdiction of the ordinary co mis. "59 
These encroachments hindered the development of the modem 
administrative state. Willis demonstrated how the judicial interpretation 
of s.96 of the JJNA Act permitted the courts to interfere in administrative 
agencies if they deemed these bodies to possess some similarities to 
superior courts. He noted that a separation of powers doctrine had been 
judicially interpreted into s.96, thus leading courts to ask whether the 
tribunal was doing what was exclusively the purview of superior courts 
56 lbtd. at 79. 
58 J. Willis, "Administrative Law and the British North America Act" (1939) 53 Harvard 
L.R. 251 at 259. 
59 Ibid. at 265. 
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in 1867.60 This question resulted in increased judicial control of the 
administrative process, and this interference, said Willis, "has been to 
retard the growth of the administrative system in Canada."61 Willis 
attacked how courts accomplished this, arguing that if it is asked how 
substantial restriction on the legislative power of the provinces has 
been evolved from a constitutional provision reserving to the 
Dominion the appointment of Superior Court judges, we can only 
point to the judicial legislation outlined above and marvel at the way in 
which deeply held political beliefs succeed in establishing themselves 
in the most unlikely phrases of constitutions.62 
Willis continued to blame the courts in his discussion of the 
judicial review of administrative action. Courts had created a "common-
law Bill of Rights" by which judges side-stepped privative clauses by 
asserting that legislatures did not intend to deprive citizens of their right 
to access the courts. This could be used by the courts to control "an 
expressed intent of which they happen to disapprove."63 In addition, 
courts controlled the procedures employed in the administrative process 
by inferring judicial procedures to tribunals, and treating procedural 
errors as excesses of jurisdiction through the employment of the 
prerogative writs certiorari or mandamus. These judicial excesses 
stemmed from the social legislation passed during the Depression: 
The years of depression since 1929 have induced legislatures to pass 
laws which are right out of line with traditional ways of thought and 
therefore distasteful both to those guardians of the past, the lawyers, 
and to their wealthy clients who have, of course, been adversely 
affected by these laws.64 
Willis' transition in focus from English to Canadian legal 
developments culminated with the publication, in 1941, of a collection 
of essays on the Canadian administrative state, entitled Canadian 
Boards at Work. 65 Willis brought together authors from a variety of 
backgrounds, including T. N01man Dean, a statistician with the Ontario 
6° For a fuller expansion of Willis' views on the judicial interpretation of s.96 see J. Willis, 
"Section 96 of the British North America Act" (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 517. 
61 Willis, supra note 58 at 270. 
62 Ibid. at 270-271. 
63 /bid. at 276. 
64 /bid. at 273. 
65 J. Willis, ed., Canadian Boards al Work (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941 ). 
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Workmen's Compensation Board; George Farquhar, a member of the 
Public Utilities Board of Nova Scotia; a former member of the Board of 
Railway Commissioners for Canada, S.J. McLean; Ontario Securities 
Commissioner, R.B. Whitehead, and professors J.A. Corry, E.F. 
Whitmore, and Jacob Finkelman. 66 The articles by Corry and Finkelman 
will be analysed later in this paper. Willis did not write an article, but 
provided a lengthy foreword, and wrote three introductory essays for 
sections of the book dealing with the work of administrative boards, 
administrative discretion, and administrative procedure. As he had done 
in his earlier work, Willis articulated his belief in a functional approach 
to administrative law, concluding that the common law courts and 
legislatures were "inadequate to perform the tasks required of a 
government of the twentieth century."67 He also demonstrated his 
continued emphasis on the functional approach when he criticized 
attempts to fit administrative agencies within the legislative, judicial, 
and executive separation of powers, suggesting that "who, except a 
lawyer or a political theorist, cares what any board conceptually 'is' as 
long as he knows what it in fact does?"68 
ii WPM. Ke11nedy a11d the Study Administrative Law 
W.P.M. Kennedy proudly reported in 1934 that the law program at 
the University of Toronto was the only university in the British Empire 
that provided special undergraduate and graduate courses in 
administrative law.69 Kennedy, as Risk has recently indicated, took an 
interest in administrative law in the late 1920s, and his inclusion of 
administrative law in the University of Toronto curriculum appeared to 
mirror this concern. Kennedy expressed many of the formalist's fears 
about the rise of the regulatory state until 1934, when he substantially 
changed his views and became a proponent of the regulatory state. 70 He 
argued for the necessity of legislative delegation in the changed societal 
circumstances of the twentieth century. Industrial development, for 
66 Other authors included D.W. Buchanan, a Traffic Manager of the Viceroy 
Manufacturing Company in Toronto; and Saskatoon practitioner R.L. Winton. Ibid. at xv. 
67 Ibid. at v. 
68 Ibid. at 2. 
69 W.P.M. Kennedy, "Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada" (1934) 46 Juridical 
Review 203 at 223. 
70 Risk, "The Many Minds," Stij?m note 3 at 376-377. 
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instance, required "not laissez-faire but government control," and 
increased government intervention "predicates increased legislation, 
and necessarily, under modern conditions, delegated legislation."71 
Kennedy made explicit his desire to make the law more attuned to the 
needs of Canada in the Depression: 
New standards must be developed in all fields of human endeavour 
which will be in harmony with the new social philosophy of the age. 
Care of the sick, the poor, the aged, and the infirm, elimination of 
slums, control of industry in the interests of humanity, protection of 
children, universal education, development of natural resources for the 
benefit of mankind, all demand immediate attention. 72 
Administrative agencies served as experimental laboratories in 
achieving these goals. These experiments were acceptable so long as 
they operated within the boundaries set up by the legislatures, and 
conformed to the most important tenants of natural justice. This latter 
stipulation required that no person judge his own cause, and that every 
person have an adequate opportunity to present his case, but did not 
include the application of technical rules of evidence, representation by 
counsel, or hearings in an open court.73 
These requirements were indicative of Kennedy's continued 
concerns about the safeguards necessary to prevent excessive 
administrative discretion. Kennedy criticized Canadians for accepting 
legislation delegating authority "even in cases where on the surface 
there appears no vital necessity for such delegation,"74 and warned of 
"the development of a vast administrative machine" that "leaves us open 
to all the dangers of bureaucracy, the arch foe of democracy."75 These 
dangers led Kennedy to inquire into the controls exercised on tribunals 
and boards. Unlike Willis and, as we shall see, Corry and Humphrey, 
Kennedy argued against the creation of a system of administrative 
courts to hear appeals from lower tribunals and agencies on the ground 
that "a system of administrative courts composed of persons imbued 
with the ideals of the civil service would strengthen the dangers. "76 
71 Supra note 69 at 207. 
72 I bid. at 221. 
73 Ibid. at 224. 
74 Ibid. at 212. 
75 Ibid. at 214. 
76 Ibid. at 228. 
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Rather, administrative boards needed to establish standards, such as the 
publication of reasons, which would permit courts to hear appeals fairly. 
While Kennedy's academic writing focused predominantly on 
Canadian constitutional law for the remainder of the 1930s, his interest 
in administrative law remained apparent in two ways. First, he included 
a chapter on administrative law in the second edition of his history of the 
Canadian constitution, published in 1938.77 The second indication of 
Kennedy's continued interest in administrative law was the content of 
the first volume of the University of Toronto Law Journal, the legal 
publication established by Kennedy in 1935.78 The first volume of the 
UTLJ included articles by three of the authors who helped reshape the 
Canadian legal profession's opinions about the value of administrative 
law. We have already discussed the article by John Willis; the others 
were by J.A. Corry and Jacob Finkelman. 
iii JA. Corry and the Political Philosophy q/ Admhzistrative Law 
J.A. Corry has mostly been remembered as a political scientist at 
Queen's, but Risk has recently stressed Corry's work as a legal 
scholar. 79 Corry's work in administrative law during the 1930s 
demonstrates his talents and interests in both scholarly fields. 
Corry published his first major article on the administrative state in 
1933. Published in the Proceedhzgs of the Canadian Political Science 
Association,8° Corry's article considered the changing social, economic, 
and political conditions that resulted in the adoption of administrative 
discretion as a device of governance. Corry asserted that parliament and 
courts were ill-suited to implementing new government programs. 
Courts, for example, employed procedures that assume "at every turn 
77 W.P.M. Kennedy, The Co11slil11/io11 of Ca11ada, !534-1937: An fttlroduc/1011 lo its 
Deve!opme11! Law m;d C11slom, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) at ch. XXVI. 
Kennedy's 1934 article in Juridical Rei;iew provided the content for this chapter on 
administrative law. 
78 In 1923, the Ca!ladian Law Ttines ( 1881-1922) and the Canada Law Jou ma! ( 1861-
1922) combined to form the Ca!ladiall !Jar Review. Edited by Charles Morse until 1934, and 
by Cecil A. Wright from 1935 to 1945, the Ca11adiall !Jar Review was the most influential 
academic legal journal in Canada during the 1930s. In 1935, however, W.P.M. Kennedy 
established and edited the U11iversity of Toro!llo Law Jou ma! as a rival academic law journal. 
79 Risk, "Volume l ," supra note 3 at 199. 
so I.A. Corry, "Administrative Law in Canada" [1933] Proceedings of the Canadian 
Political Science Association 190. 
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that all men are equally able to defend their rights"81 and that their 
"whole emphasis is upon private right rather than social need."82 In 
making these assertions, Corry demonstrated his lack of faith in 
nineteenth-century formalist principles. "The common law courts are 
deprived of their control over the official," Corry argued 
partly because of a lack of sympathy with social aims but mainly 
because they are not suitable instruments for the furtherance of a 
policy. For it has been their chief glory to have no policy other than to 
hold the scales of justice evenly between interests which, in theory at 
any rate, were capable of precise definition. 83 
While Corry believed that administrative agencies helped alleviate such 
problems, he also perceived the development of new issues, including 
inadequate parliamentary supervision of boards and tribunals, and the 
potential hmm done to individual rights by hasty administrative action. 
In the end, he recognized that administrative bodies were "simply a 
device of governance which, like all others, may be abused." 
Furthermore, 
whether it should be encouraged or resisted depends, not upon 
whether it accommodates itself to the abstractions which satisfied the 
temper and environment of an era of political development now 
belonging to the past, but upon the nature of the result aimed at, the 
efficacy of tried, traditional methods to achieve it and the character of 
the interests which may be imperilled by its adoption in the particular 
case. Only upon a balance of these considerations can a useful 
judgment be rendered. 84 
Corry published three more articles and a book on administrative 
law by 1941, and these works remained primarily, though not 
exclusively, focused on the political influences affecting administrative 
boards. In 1936, he discussed the benefits and problems of publicly-run 
industries and powerful regulatory boards in the Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science. 85 He also published an article in the 
first volume of the UniFersity of Toronto Law Journal entitled 
81 Ibid. at 192. 
82 Ibid. at 193. 
sJ Ibid. 
84 Ibid. at 206. 
85 J.A. Corry, "The Fusion of Government and Business" (1936) 2 Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 30 I. 
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"Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes."86 Despite its 
title, this article was concerned primarily with statutory interpretation, a 
process he argued was a creative exercise. This led Corry to question 
why courts failed to acknowledge their role in shaping the 
administrative state. The common law tendency was for judges to 
safeguard private rights from arbitrary action, but unfortunately judges 
failed to "search out the objectives of state action or the means necessary 
to achieve them. And any ambiguity in the rule will be resolved in 
favour of individual rights rather than administrative efficiency."87 This 
often stultified parliament's aims, Corry argued, and thus "[w]e must 
look much more closely at what the judges do than at what they say."88 
The inherently legislative role of judges affected administrative law. 
"The modem state everywhere is engaged in adjusting itself to the 
machine age," Corry explained, and legislators establish boards and 
tribunals to meet new socio-economic challenges, but "at present the 
judges interpret and apply these statutes and thus can further or obstruct 
their objects. Unless they are familiar with the aim and purpose of the 
legislation so as to aid in the adjustment, the orderly process will fail or 
pass to other hands."89 
Corry's next major project on administrative law was a 1939 study 
prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations. 90 Ten chapters of this project examined the historical 
expansion of regulation in such areas as public health, railways, and 
labour relations. These descriptive chapters focused on the structure of 
regulatory initiatives, and on the particular societal forces which 
resulted in individual legislative schemes. The report is noteworthy here 
for two reasons. First, Corry explained the reasons for the creation of ad 
hoc administrative tribunals exercising judicial and legislative 
functions. As he had done in previous articles, he focused on the shift in 
political philosophy. During the nineteenth century the doctrine of 
laissezfaire "received powerful confirmation in the everyday scene," 
Corry asserted, and thus the 
86 I.A. Corry, "Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes" ( 1935-1936) 1 
U.T.L.J. 286. 
87 /bid. at 288. 
88 /bid. at 289. 
89 /bid. at 293. 
90 I.A. Cony, The Growth (}/lJ0111i11ion Activities Sfi7ce C01rfet!eratio11 (Ottawa, 1939). 
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self-made men who have moulded Canada saw convincing proof of 
the maxim in their own success. This belief in a self-reliant 
individualism was strong enough to postpone any serious attempt at 
state regulation until the twentieth century and to prevent any 
significant development of social services other than education, until 
after the Great War. 91 
After the First World War, however, a change in assumptions about the 
state/citizen relationship required a new form of governance. The report 
is also noteworthy because Corry addressed whether a system of 
administrative courts was preferable for controlling administrative 
discretion. Corry argued that if courts reviewed the discretionary 
decisions of administrative bodies then it was necessary that they be 
experts in the area under consideration, and that they be well-infonned 
of the legislation's purpose. Common law courts were poorly equipped 
for these functions, and were hindered by their inherently conservative 
nature. However, the palpable danger of unlimited discretion led Corry 
to argue, like Willis, for the establishment of permanent administrative 
courts which would apply a uniform set of procedures when dealing 
with disputes between individuals and state officials.92 
Corry also wrote the introduction to Willis' 1941 book Canadian 
Boards at Work. Here Corry outlined some of the major types of boards, 
and, more importantly, continued to drive home his explanation of the 
shift in philosophical assumptions which underlay the need for 
administrative agencies. 93 "The role which govermnent is expected to 
play in any society largely determines the means which are to be 
employed," suggested Corry, and thus in "any discussion of the part 
played by boards and commissions in present-day government, this 
close relationship between methods and objectives must be kept 
constantly in mind."94 Laissez-:flui'e presumptions had dictated that the 
state should have little involvement in the day to day life of citizens, but 
with industrialization and urbanization laissezfaire was rejected 
"because it was found to be inadequate in a complex society. It is to be 
replaced by a collectivist ideal which aims at the welfare of the group, 
91 /bid at 5. 
92 Ibid. at 16. 
93 J.A. Conyr, "The Genesis and Nature of Boards" in Willis, supra at note 65, xvii. 
94 /bid. at xvii. 
THE CANADIAN LEGAL REALISTS ... 59 
albeit at considerable cost to the claim of the individual to do as he 
pleases."95 
iv. Jacob Finkelman and the Separation ef Powers 
Jacob Finkelman's first foray into the debate about administrative 
law also came in the first issue of the University ef Toronto Law 
Journal. In "Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law,"96 
Finkelman explored the validity of the tripartite division of government 
into 'legislative,' 'executive,' and 'judicial' parts. Finkelman related the 
attacks of Lord Hewart and C.K. Allen, and asserted that these critiques 
were part of a larger movement in which criticisms 
from the courts became more pronounced as parliament, apparently 
convinced that the traditional conservatism of the judiciary was ill-
suited for the application of new social standards, and itself groaning 
under the weight of unparalleled burdens, boldly took the bit between 
its teeth, and began to withdraw more and more jurisdiction from the 
courts.97 
Finkelman drew upon Willis' "Three Approaches to Administrative 
Law" article in asking whether the concepts of legislative, executive, 
and judicial had precise meanings. He quickly dismissed the accuracy of 
the terms, suggesting that "it has never been found possible to 
differentiate absolutely the functions of govemment."98 The remainder 
of his paper focused on issues relating to judicial review of 
administrative decisions, and the judicial construction of constitutional 
instruments. 
Finkelman argued throughout his paper that doctrine did not 
determine the outcome of cases. For example, he pointed out that the 
distinctions between 'ministerial' and 'judicial' employed in mandamus 
often broke down such that they "do not represent anything of 
definiteness."99 Similarly, the separation of powers distinction "has no 
place as a principle of law." 100 Rather, practical concerns should 
95 Ibid. at xix. 
96 J. Finkelman, "Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law" ( 1935-1936) 1 
U.T.L.J. 313. For brief discussion of this article see Risk, "Volume I," supra note 3 at 203-
204. 
97 Finkelman, ibid. at 318. 
98 Ibid. at 320. 
99 /bid. at 324. 
100 Ibid. at 341. 
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develop an effective working system. The allocation of powers "need 
not imply either theoretical or actual separation, but leaves ample room 
for interaction," and thus the allocation of government functions "grows 
out of necessity and common sense."101 Finkelman concluded with a 
plea that practical concerns dominate the consideration of 
administrative law. Interestingly, Finkelman saw the freedom of courts 
to intervene in the administrative process as imperative to this aim. "It is 
better for law, in serving the ends of society," contemplated Finkelman, 
to allow as much freedom as possible to the judiciary in controlling 
'administrative' action, to take the risk of confused judgments, of 
'distinguishings', of' distinctions', rather than to cabin and confine the 
discretion of the judges. We are here dealing with a field of law which 
by its very nature defies standardization or the alleged symmetry of 
codification. The time is not yet ripe for the laying down of any 
complete scheme of the relationship between the judiciary and 
administrative law; and we can only hope that, ifthat time ever comes, 
there will prevail such a sanity, derived from experience and goodwill, 
as will result in preserving a due balance between working efficiency 
and the life of the individual citizen. 102 
In Finkelman's second major piece on administrative law, 
published in 1939, he provided a powerful argument as to why modem 
states required administrative bodies. 103 Finkelman asked his readers to 
consider how changes in the social philosophy of government 
necessitated the creation of new institutions. "The situation may be 
summed up in a few words," Finkelman argued: society "is abandoning 
one philosophy and is adopting another. Laissezfaire is rapidly fading 
into the limbo of forgotten things and in its place we are developing new 
doctrines .... " 104 Finkelman then returned to a discussion of the 
separation of powers, arguing that the nineteenth-century focus on 
liberty led to the division between judicial, executive, and legislative 
branches. These were aiiificial, theoretical distinctions, and Finkelman 
asked his readers to "tum from theory to practise," and "tum from 
diatribes to realities; let us examine facts." 105 The legal system had 
milTored the dominant philosophy of individualism, but then 
JOI /bk/. 
102 /bid. at 342. 
103 J. Finkelman, "Government by Civil Servants" (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 166. 
/bid. at 166. 
105 /bid. at 170. 
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came the rude awakening. The romance was ended. Laissez-fit/re had 
failed to bring happiness to the masses of mankind. In fact, the untold 
misery and suffering and the social waste which followed in the wake 
of the new industrial system caused a revulsion of feeling which is 
gradually undermining even the positive achievements of the past 
century. 106 
Governments needed to balance collective and individual needs, and 
people turned to the state for assistance. 
Finkelman, however, had concerns about the new administrative 
state. People demanded from their politicians a more activist 
government, but Finkelman asse1ied that politicians had "passed the 
buck" to new administrative agencies. 107 He recognized the positive 
attributes of these administrative agencies - including their speed, 
technical skill, accessibility, freedom from technicality, and experience 
- but expressed concern about the explosion of boards and tribunals. 
Noting that Parliament should not abdicate its powers, he warned that 
there were "many grave dangers inherent in such delegation, and the 
critics of the system are quite right in calling attention to these 
dangers." 108 Finkelman therefore advocated the creation of safeguards 
similar to those which made Parliament the protector of British liberties 
that is, that the public, through the democratic process, be active in 
shaping the design and policies implemented by tribunals. In addition, 
Finkelman encouraged the employment of three essential principles of 
justice: that no person judge his or her own case, that no pa1iy be 
condemned unheard, and that parties know the reasons for decisions. 109 
Finkelman also contributed to Willis' book on Canadian boards. 110 
After indicating the extensive expansion of delegated authority, and the 
concurrent increase in the powers delegated, Finkelman allayed fears 
that the Ontario legislature had lost control over administrative bodies. 
The cabinet governed administrative law through the issuance of 
106 Ibid. at 171. 
107 Ibid. at 174. 
108 Ibid. at 176. He went on to assert that "as a lawyer, I would be so bold as to say that the 
dangers here are greater than in the case of the delegation oflegislative power; and I would like 
to assure you that this statement is not dictated by sentimental attachment to established 
procedures." Ibid. at 176-177. 
109 Ibid. at 177. 
110 Jacob Finkelman, "The Making, Approval and Publication of Delegated Legislation in 
Ontario" in Willis, supra note 65, 170. 
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regulations, suggested Finkelman, though he warned that care should be 
taken in the formulation of regulations because they "cannot be subject 
to the scrutiny of parliamentary debate," and thus "it would not be too 
much to expect that the administrative authority which enacts them 
should be most meticulous in its efforts to ensure that no injustice will be 
caused through their operation." 111 In the end, however, delegated 
legislation would only be controlled by the expression of public opinion 
and its subsequent effect on the legislature. 112 
v. E Russell Hopkins, John P Humphrey and Fears o/Discretion 
Two new figures published on Canadian administrative law in 
1939: E. Russell Hopkins and John Humphrey. Both scholars gave 
considerable attention to alleviating the fears among the Canadian legal 
community about the administrative state, although they used somewhat 
different methods to accomplish this goal. 
In his paper "Administrative Justice in Canada," Hopkins 
explained at length the need for a new method of government which 
would include extensive use of administrative tribunals. 113 He asserted 
that administrative law was "no longer an illegitimate exotic," 114 but 
admitted that boards and tribunals employed diverse procedures. These 
procedures were excused on the ground that they were "experimental 
laboratories whose activity is accompanied by the confusion and 
irregularity associated with the process of trial and error."115 
In arguing for the administrative state, Hopkins employed three 
broad arguments. First, like earlier Canadian legal realists, he attempted 
to demonstrate the artificiality of the distinction between judicial and 
administrative decision-making. The division between administrative 
discretion and legal rule "stands firm in the heaven of ideas," but sways 
"uneasily in the earthier air of application," 116 suggested Hopkins. 
\II /bid. at 188. 
i 12 Ibid. 
113 E.R. Hopkins, "Administrative Justice in Canada" (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 619. 
Hopkins presented his ideas earlier in an address to the Canadian Bar Association's annual 
meeting. E.R. Hopkins, "Administrative Justice in Canada" in Mtizutes qf Proceedlizgs of the 
Twenty-Fourth Annual 1kfeeting qf the Canadian Bar Association (Ottawa: National Printers, 
1940) 142. 
114 Hopkins (1939), ibid. at 619. 
115 Ibid. at 621. 
116 Ibid. at 622. 
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Discretion was inherent in administrative and judicial decision making, 
a view that was implicit in Hopkins' view of the judicial process: 
It is fully recognized by the bar that legal opinions are as their name 
implies in the nature of reasoned prophesies; that facts like witnesses 
are not always reliable; that whenever recorded authority is silent, 
obscure or confused, the judge is driven towards measures of 
innovation; and that, moreover, with broad changes in the facts and 
standards of society must come a gradual alchemy in the adjustment of 
wise laws to modern instances. 117 
In his second argument for the regulatory state, Hopkins focused on 
the differences, rather than the similarities, between the administrative 
and judicial decision-making processes. Judges applied existing legal 
rules to the extent that changing social conditions permitted, but the 
decision-making process in administrative law "contemplates the 
settling of affairs by the discretionary pursuit of generalized statutory 
objectives." 118 Thus, while both judges and administrators made 
choices, boards and tribunals had more flexibility. This was necessary 
because governance in England and Canada required increased state 
action to decrease the hardships of the individualist state and laissez-
.faire economics. Thus, "the teteology oflaw is undergoing alteration; it 
is no longer expressible simply in terms of the abstract freedom of the 
abstract man. Freedom, it is true, is still an aim of government; but it is 
freedom with security." 119 
Hopkins' third argument focused on the benefits of the regulatory 
state and promised increased certainty in the application of 
administrative law in the years ahead. While admitting that occasional 
errors would occur, he advocated experimentation. Citing Willis, 
Hopkins called for a functional approach, pointing out the time and cost 
savings of administrative law, and that board members possessed 
specialized knowledge of the questions under dispute. Hopkins also 
employed an argument in favour of administrative agencies aimed 
directly at the pocketbooks of his fellow legal professionals. "It may be 
added that of this legal order those learned in the law must remain 
principal trustees," Hopkins pointed out, and between "the individual 
and the state today there stands a maze of law and policy through which 
117 /bid. at 623. 
118 /bid. at 624. 
119 /bid. at 626. 
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the trained lawyer... is the most likely guide."120 To further allay fears of 
the administrative process, Hopkins pointed out that incorporating more 
lawyers would introduce order and regularity, and "sponsor the growth 
of an adequate theory of social control which without seriously 
impairing the efficiency of these bodies would have due regard to the 
event of individual justice."121 He also hoped for increased certainty in 
this new area of the law, believing that the discretion of boards and 
tribunals would "resolve itself into rule and standard and administrative 
law will increasingly approximate justice according to law."122 
Humphrey also demonstrated a desire to organize and 
conceptualize administrative law. Humphrey began his 1939 article in 
the Canadian Journal and Economics and Political Science by quickly 
recounting the story of changed political and social circumstances 
requiring the expansion of the regulatory state. 123 His primary concern, 
however, was to identify the legal controls on illegal or arbitrary 
administrative action. After asserting that courts provided the only 
safeguards, he discussed various remedies including injunctions, 
mandamus, habeas co1pus, quo warranto, prohibition, and certiorari. 
Humphrey warned against an extension of judicial interference on 
grounds other than jurisdictional or procedural error since "the courts 
have no standards to guide them, and can only substitute their own ideas 
of what is in the public interest for the ideas of the administrative 
authority, a function that would not be judicial but legislative."124 
Wary of increased judicial discretion to interfere with the 
administrative process, Humphrey firmly advocated for the creation of a 
independent system of administrative review. The existing remedies for 
individuals in the administrative process were "hopelessly inadequate" 
providing "neither protection for the individual nor a means of ensuring 
efficient administration." 125 Humphrey's solution? Like Willis and 
Corry, Humphrey argued that "[t]he only possible solution, therefore, 
would seem to be the creation of a system of administrative courts in 
120 Ibid. at 635. 
121 Ibid. at 636. 
122 Ibid. at 636-637. 
123 John P. Humphrey, "Judicial Control over Administrative Action with Special 
Reference to the Province of Quebec" ( 1939) 5 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science 41 7 at 417. 
124 Ibid. at 427. 
125 Ibid. at 429. 
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which both the Legislature and the Administration can have 
confidence. " 126 
J[.....,,l,,.....,,C> IN THE CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
SCHOLARSHIP 
There are several very noticeable trends made clear by the 
preceeding synopsis of the scholarly writing on administrative law in the 
1930s. The first trend was the vicious attack launched against 
nineteenth-century liberalism and its related ideas about the individual 
and the laissez-:faire economy. Legal academics, of course, were not the 
only Canadians to question these basic assumptions during the 
Depression. Many Canadians questioned the traditional way of 
understanding the relationship between the citizen and the state. Alvin 
Finkel, for example, concludes that some elements of the Canadian 
business community supported government economic regulation and 
expensive social programs in the hope that these policies would level out 
the business cycle. 127 Many of Canada's non-legal intellectuals, and 
members of the expanding dominion government bureaucracy also held 
these beliefs. 128 
126 ibid. at 430. 
127 Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (Toronto: James Lorimer, 
1979). Finkel also discerns frustration amongst business people when courts deemed 
government regulatory initiatives unconstitutional, particularly after the New Deal decisions. 
Many business people wanted more power given to the dominion government, and would have 
agreed with J.F. Davison of the George Washington University School of Law, who wrote in 
the Canadian Bar Re)Jfew that "formal arid legalism of the theorists" dictated that the "position 
of words and punctuation marks in written briefs has been of greater importance than the 
position of industrial units and their combinations for trade and industrial purposes." J.F. 
Davison, "The Constitutional Utility of Advisory Opinions" (1937-1938) 2 U.T.L.J. 254 at 
274. 
Davison was born in Halifax and completed his LLB at Dalhousie. He continued his 
academic career at Harvard where he received a LL.Mand S.J.D. by 1929. He promptly began 
teaching at George Washington University where he specialized in corporate and 
administrative law. Davison wrote about the crisis in formalism in his 1929 article on 
jurisprudence. "After years of realism and academic doubt, sociologists, political theorists, 
philosophers and jurists are eagerly seeking some formulre which shall contain fundamental 
rules for the guidance of contemporary civilisation," suggested Davison, and they "do not seek 
the absolutes which the nineteenth century writers sought, but rather something to ensure that 
permanence and security which the consolidation of wealth created by the industrial and 
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scientific development of the last two centuries so urgently demands." J.F. Davison, "The 
Study of Jurisprudence" (1929) 7 Can. Bar Rev. 438 at 444. Davison also published an 
administrative law case book with American realist scholar Felix Frankfurter in 1932. See 
Felix Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison, Cases and 1Vfaterials on Admti1istrative Lmv 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1932). 
128 For a discussion see Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian 
.!t1tellectuals and the Stale, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). The 
Canadian intellectual class was deeply concerned about the Depression, and the judiciary's 
interpretation of the BNA Act. Owram suggests that this group formed in the early 1930s, and 
included, among others, McGill economist and lawyer H. Carl Goldenburg; political scientist 
and lawyer Norman Rogers of Queen's University; University of Toronto historian Frank 
Underhill, and political scientists Harold Innis and V.W. Bladen; and McGill law professors 
Brooke Claxton and Frank Scott. These intellectuals believed they should shape government 
policy, and thus made inroads into the expanding federal government bureaucracy of the late 
1930s. They were also preoccupied with the Canadian constitution, particularly after the 
JCPC's New Deal decisions. As the 1930s progressed, the intellectuals deemed constitutional 
change a necessary preliminary step to an adequate program of social legislation. They were 
instrumental in shaping the 1940 Rowell-Sirois Commission's report on the state of Canadian 
federalism which advocated that the dominion government should possess greater taxing 
powers, and create National Adjustment Grants to equalize social programs across the 
country. Existing historical literature has downplayed the connections between the legal 
realists and the 'government generation,' but their mutual concern with the modern 
administrative state indicates that the connections between the groups requires further 
research. 
These non-legal intellectuals produced an immense amount of scholarship on the Canadian 
state. Prior to the explosion of discipline-specific journals after World War Two, many of 
Canada's most respected publications were non-specific academic journals that published on a 
wide-variety of topics. These publications were likely read by many law professors and 
lawyers, who were thus exposed to the critiques of the judicial interpretation of the BNA Act 
published by intellectuals in the Queens Quarterly, Dalhousie !feJJ!ew, Canadian Joumal i?f 
Economics and Political Scknce, and Canadian Forum. 
A gauge of the interplay between the 'government generation' and the legal profession was 
the publication by non-legal academics in Canadian law journals during the 1930s. In 
particular, the Canadkm Bar Review published articles by Norman Rogers and Carl 
Goldenburg, both of whom worked as social scientists and possessed legal training. See 
Norman McL. Rogers, "The Compact Theory of Confederation" (1931) 9 Can. Bar Rev. 395; 
Norman McL. Rogers, "The Dominion and the Provinces" (1933) 11 Can. Bar Rev. 338; 
Norman McL. Rogers, "The Introduction of Cabinet Government in Canada" (1933) 11 Can. 
Bar Rev. 1; and No1man McL. Rogers, "Federal Influences on the Canadian Cabinet" (1933) 
11 Can. Bar Rev. 103; Carl Goldenberg, "Social and Economic Problems in Canadian 
Federalism" (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 422 at 425. 
In addition, some of Canada's legal professionals explicitly accepted the ideas propounded 
by non-legal academics by incorporating the work of these social scientists in many of their 
articles. For example, Dalhousie's Vincent MacDonald's discussion of the judicial 
interpretation of the constitution drew upon the aiiicles by Goldenburg, Rogers, and O.D. 
Skelton published in journals such as the Queen s Qum1erly, the Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political SC1e11ce, and the Froceed!i1gs of !he Canadian Political Science 
Association. Vincent C. MacDonald, "Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution" 
(1935-1936) 1 U.T.L.J. 260 at 260, 276, 282, 283, 284. 
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Just as historians have connected the ascent of legal formalism to 
nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics and liberal individualism, 
the decline of these assumptions was tied to the crisis in Canadian 
writing about the administrative state during the 1930s. More advanced 
social welfare policies pressured the assumption that the law preserved 
individual independence against state interference. This gradual 
acceptance of the increased place of the interventionist state was 
apparent in the annual reports of the Canadian Bar Association's 
committee on statute law. In 1931, the committee reported that 
expanding governmental programs would make it difficult "to get 
people back to the more fundamental principle of individual 
responsibility .... " 129 The committee's view, however, had altered 
somewhat by 1939 when it noted that the dominant nineteenth-century 
goal was "to secure to the individual the largest possible measure of 
personal freedom," but since World War One society sought "social 
security and a prosperity in which all shall share."130 
As we have seen, Willis, Kennedy, Corry, Finkelman, Humphrey, 
and Hopkins shared an awareness of changing socio-political 
assumptions, and a corresponding need for the law to change. Kennedy 
perceived this early on, 131 telling the Canadian Bar Association in 1929 
that the "individual and his 'rights"' was "giving place to the community 
and its needs." 132 The modern state was henceforth to achieve its ends 
not by balancing "individuals against one another as legal 'right-
bearing' atoms, but as members of groups and associations whose 
interests are beneficial."133 In 1934, Corry argued that formalist rules of 
statutory interpretation were inadequate because they were "developed 
to interpret statutory changes in the Common Law in an age which was 
agreed on the primacy of individual rights." In Depression-era Canada, 
129 "Report of the Committee on Notewo1ihy Changes in the State Law" in Aflill!tes <flhe 
Proceedri1gs ()(the Slrteenth Anllual Meetli1g ()(the Canadian Bar Association (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1932) 138 at 140. 
130 "Report of the Committee on Notewo1ihy Changes in Statute Law, 1939" in Afliut!es of 
Proceedings of the Twm!y-Fourth Annual 1Weetti1g of the Canadian Bar Associatioll (Ottawa: 
National Printers, 1940) 196 at 199. 
131 Risk, "The Many Minds," supra note 3 at 365-367. 
132 W.P.M. Kennedy, "Theories of Law and the Constitutional Law of the British Empire" 
in M!imles ()(the Proceedli1gs of the Fourteell!h Allllllal Meetli1g of the Calladia11 Bar 
Associatioll (Toronto: Carswell, 1930) at 152 at 162. 
133 /bid. at 163. 
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however, "the great bulk of statutes have to do with the creation or 
modification of administrative machinery designed to protect certain 
paramount public interests" and thus the "world will not wait while we 
misconstrue these provisions by placing them against a background of 
the Common Law instead of reading them in light of the social and 
economic life with which they deal." 134 Other Canadian realists also 
shared these beliefs; for example, in 193 7 a bright young scholar named 
Bora Laskin advocated the necessity of taking social factors into 
account in legal reasoning: 
The accepted complexity of our modern world, the myriad contending 
social forces in a continual state of ferment, the constantly changing 
social conditions of society, impose a heavy task on courts and 
legislatures to keep the law abreast of current trends. Nor are they in a 
position to equivocate. The impelling force of economic 
circumstances has driven them into hurried activity to seek, from their 
cul-de-sac, to avert the possibility of unexampled disorder through the 
raproachment of competing social interests, by throwing the weight of 
the state behind those interests which the individualistic legal theories 
of an evanescent period have proven pitifully inadequate to protect. 135 
This alteration in political assumptions made it imperative that the 
legal profession change its basic understanding of how the law operated. 
Thus, the second broad trend was an almost continual assault on 
134 J.A. Corry, Book Review of The Par/iomen/01y Powers o/ English Gover11me11! 
Depm1menls, by John Willis (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 60 at 64. 
135 B. Laskin, "The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problems of 'Contracting 
Out"' (1937) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 669 at 669-670. Laskin graduated from Kennedy's 
undergraduate law program in 1933, then attained his M.A. and LL.B degrees at the 
University of Toronto in 1935 and 1936 respectively. Encouraged by Osgoode Hall's Cecil 
Wright, Laskin completed an LL.Mat Harvard in 1937. A full-time professor at the University 
of Toronto (1940-1945, 1949-1965) and Osgoode Hall (1945-1949), Laskin accepted an 
appointment to the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1965, followed by elevation to the Supreme 
Court five years later. 
For additional acknowledgments that liberal ideals were weakening within the Canadian 
legal community see Jules Preudhomme, "Are We Our Brother's Helper" ( 1932-1933) 5 Man. 
B.N. 10; Mannie Brown, "Dependants' Relief Acts" (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 261; Mannie 
Brown, "An Experiment in Compulsory Co-operation The No!zrral Prodzrcls Aforke1ti1g Act, 
1934" (1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 71; "Address of Honourable James Grafton Rogers" in 
lvftimtes o/ Proceedti1gs o/ the Eighteenth A1111uo! Jl,feetti1g q/the Co11odion Bor Associat/011 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1934) 92; N.W. Rowell, "Presidential Address: Our Heritage in the Civil 
Law and the Common Law" in lifimtles o/ Proceedti1gs q/t!te Nti1etee11th A mural A-feet1i1g q/ 
the Co11odkm Bor Associo!to!l (Ottawa: National Printers, 1935) 37 at 47. 
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fo1malist thinking. Canadian realists were highly sceptical of conceptual 
and abstract thinking in any area of the law. Issues like parliamentary 
sovereignty seemed less important in the face of the Depression than did 
the creation of (to use Willis' favourite phrase) a functional approach to 
administrative law. Practicalities, not theory, were the most important 
considerations. The Canadian scholars were similar to their English 
academic cousins in this regard, who, according to Martin Loughlin, 
employed an empirical and historical approach to administrative law, 
argued for framework legislation and delegated legislation as essential 
to efficient administrative allocation of administrative tasks, and 
advocated for the creation of tribunals and boards in which the people 
with the best technical knowledge and expertise would determine 
outcomes. 136 
The third trend showed that, while the Canadian legal realists were 
highly adept at critiquing judicial and professional attitudes towards 
administrative law, they generally failed to provide an adequate 
framework for future administrative schemes. This may have resulted 
from the size of the foe these academics challenged. Immense amounts 
of their efforts were spent identifying the change in socio-political 
assumptions and the need for law to meet these new demands. 
Relatively little time was devoted to discussing, for example, when 
courts should consider reviewing administrative decisions. Most of 
these academics failed to give much attention to the question of what 
procedures administrative tribunals should employ beyond broad 
principles of natural justice. As we have seen, these scholars were 
talented at advocating for a faith in expertise, rejecting the attitudes of 
courts, and defending administrative discretion, but were less sure what 
the new administrative state might look like upon completion. The 
differing attitudes about the establishment of an independent 
administrative appeal comi exemplified this failure to reach consensus 
on the structure of the regulatory process. As we have seen, Corry, 
Willis, and Humphrey proposed a system of administrative courts; 
Finkelman, Kennedy, and Hopkins, on the other hand, looked to the 
common law courts to review administrative errors. 
136 St.pra note I 0 at 168-169. 
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VI. A SPREADING ACCEPTANCE OF ADMINISTATIVE LAw? 
Existing literature on legal attitudes towards the administrative 
state during the 1930s emphasizes the polarity of positions between the 
academic realists and Canada's practitioners. 137 Many lawyers and 
judges clearly had concerns about the growth of the administrative state 
during this period, but a survey of Canada's regional and practice-
focused law journals hints that the realists may have begun a shift in the 
debate about administrative law by the end of the 1930s. 138 The 
conservative Fortnightly Law Journal remained unconvinced, leading 
attacks on administrative tribunals throughout the l 930s. 139 The 
Saskatchewan Bar Review was similarly unswayed. 140 The contents of 
137 See e.g. Risk, "Lawyers," supra note 4 at 41; and J. Willis, "Canadian Administrative 
Law in Retrospect" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225 at 228. 
138 An analysis of the effect of the Canadian legal realists on the broader legal profession is 
of course very difficult. The following analysis of the contents of Canada's less academically-
oriented law journals is offered as only one potential starting point for future research on these 
trends. These journals are also employed out of a belief that they have been underutilised by 
Canadian legal historians studying the shift in lawyers' attitudes about the law. 
The shift argued for here was likely assisted by the establishment of courses on 
administrative law at some Canadian law schools. The University of Toronto instituted such a 
course in the early 1930s, and Dalhousie in 1937. Willis, ibid. at 230. 
139 Robert Michael Willes Chitty edited the Fortmghtly Law Joumal from the journal's 
inception in 1931. Under Chitty's direction, the Fortnightly Law Journal was the voice of 
Canadian legal conservatism. Chitty, for example, was well-known for his resistance to the 
modernization oflegal education in Ontario. Kyer and Bickenbach, supra note 34 at 139. State 
action, the Fortmght!y Law Joumal typically argued, undermined individual rights. It often 
made analogies between the expansion in Canadian government regulation and the fascist 
activity in Japan and Europe. In 1937, for instance, the Fortmghtly Law Journal 
complimented the courts on turning back increased government regulation, and theorized that 
"the ingenuity of the politician is being taxed to devise new means of attack in this warfare in 
the which the aggressor is as obvious as in the Sino-Japanese conflict." "Another Battle in the 
Legislature's War on the Courts" (1937) 7 Fortnightly Law Journal 114 at 114. Similarly, in 
1939 it asserted that "the war the Courts are fighting is a war against would-be Hitlerism in our 
government." "Legislative Fight to Dominate the Courts" (1939) 9 Fortnightly Law Journal 
65 at 65. Also see, for example, "Government by Regulation" (1934) 4 Fortnightly Law 
Journal 129; W. McKeah, "The Evils of Legislation by Regulation" (1934) 4 Fortnightly Law 
Journal 136; "War on Bureaucracy" (1937) 7 Fortnightly Law Journal 82; "Constitutional 
Limitations Upon the Growth of Administrative Tribunals" (1938) 7 Fortnightly Law Journal 
297; "The Road to Dictatorship" (1938) 8 Fortnightly Law Journal 113. 
140 See, e.g., F.W. Turnball, "Are Coutts and Judges to be Discarded?" (1938) 3 Sask. Bar 
Rev. 68; and "Views of the Profession" (1937) 2 Sask. Bar Rev. 23 in which several 
Saskatchewan lawyers expressed their concern with the Depression-era expansion of boards 
and tribunals. 
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the Manitoba Bar News and the Bench and Bar, however, indicate a 
limited increase in the acceptance of administrative tribunals. For 
example, while a number of aiiicles in the Manitoba Bar News141 
expressed concern about the rise of administrative tribunals in the 
1930s,142 the decade ended with a response to these attacks. In an article 
entitled "In Defence of Administrative Tribunals," Leslie Orr Rowland 
argued that "the law administered by our present judicial system has 
reached its limit of improvement or development. The formality of 
procedure, the intricacies of pleadings, the observance of precedent, 
have all contributed to stopping the natural development of the 
communal law."143 
Articles in the Bench and Bar displayed a similar trend during the 
1930s. 144 Less formalist perspectives appeared by 1934. The Bench and 
Bar editorialized that in "a country the size of Canada it is inevitable that 
certain functions of government must be delegated to special bodies."145 
The Bench and Bar also reported on a speech by Dean James Grafton 
Rogers of the University of Colorado Law School. Rogers contended 
that lawyers would 
accept and understand the machine1y of administrative law, will aid in 
devising machinery to remedy its present clumsy operation, and we 
may even see a separate or parallel system of administrative tribunals 
set up, instead of trying to call on judges trained in common law 
methods to adapt themselves to a system so alien in spirit and 
method. 146 
141 The 1Vlcmitoba Bar News started in 1928 under the editorialship of J. Ragnar Johnson, a 
graduate of the Manitoba Law School and the LL.M program at Harvard. Dale Gibson and Lee 
Gibson, Sl!bstantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba, !670-1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis 
Publishers, 1972) at 251. 
142 See, e.g., "The New Despotism" (1929-1930) 2 Man. B.N. 4; F.E. Simpson, "Whither 
Canada? Rule of Law or Bureaucracy (1934-1935) 7 Man. B.N. 6; "Editorial" (1936-1937) 
9 Man. B.N. 344; Administrative Tribunals in Manitoba" (1937-1938) 10 Man. B.N. 569; 
C.V. McArthur, "Signs of the Times" (1939-1940) 12 Man. B.N. 65. 
143 Leslie Orr Rowland, "In Defence of Administrative Tribunals" (1939-1940) 12 Man. 
B.N. 122 at 123. See also R.B. Graham, "Signs of The Times" (1939-1940) 12 Man. B.N. 85. 
144 The Bench and Bar was a national legal newspaper under the editorialship of Harold 
Rose that started publication in I 931 and reported notable legal events. For conservative 
comments on the growth of administrative tribunals see "Commissions and Courts" (March 
1933) 3 Bench and Bar 2; and "Legal Frankenstein?" (July 1933) 3 Bench and Bar 2. 
145 "Sixty-Seven Years of Confederation" (July 1934) 4 Bench and Bar 2 at 2. 
146 "A New Legal Profession" (July 1935) 5 Bench and Bar 12 at 12. See also the comments 
of John Willis in "The Profession Speaks" (July 1935) 5 Bench and Bar 2. 
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While these assertions were still few in number during the late 1930s, 
their inclusion in the Manitoba Bar News and Bench and Bar hints at a 
slow change in attitudes. 
VII CONCLUSION 
By 1941 the Canadian realists had written an impressive collection 
of scholarly legal work on the Canadian administrative state. These 
authors helped undermine traditional ways of thinking about the 
administrative state, and, more importantly, about the basic functioning 
of the law. Frank Scott criticized this literature in 1948, suggesting that 
Canadian administrative law writing "except when dealing with special 
aspects of Canadian federalism, has been largely derivative, having 
followed closely the lead of English and American scholars and 
publicists."147 In retrospect, Scott's analysis seems overly harsh. The 
Canadian legal realists identified that the Depression was a time of 
change - a terrifying time, but also a time of experimentation in public 
law. That Willis, Finkelman, Corry, Kennedy, Humphrey, and Hopkins 
could not fully construct a new system of administrative law attuned to 
Canadian needs in a single decade should not de-value their efforts at 
undermining formalist approaches to the law. There was still much to be 
thought through after the publication of the works described in this 
paper. The realists, however, had slain many of the fears about the 
growing administrative state. In the years ahead, courts and academics 
would wrestle with the appropriate standard of review to be applied to 
the decisions of tribunals and boards. The critics of the 1930s, however, 
had accomplished their goal: by convincing Canadian lawyers that 
discretion existed in administrative and judicial processes, and that 
policy implications were inherent in any decision, these academics 
opened the door for future debate and scholarship in administrative law. 
147 F.R. Scott, "Administrative Law: 1923-1947" (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 268 at 268. 
